Bankruptcy - Penalty Assessed Against Trustee by B., H.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 2 | Number 2
January 1940
Bankruptcy - Penalty Assessed Against Trustee
H. B.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
H. B., Bankruptcy - Penalty Assessed Against Trustee, 2 La. L. Rev. (1940)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol2/iss2/10
Notes
BANKRUPTCY-PENALTY ASSESSED AGAINST TRUSTEE-Section
57 (j) of the bankruptcy act provides that "Debts owing to the
United States or any State or subdivision thereof as a penalty or
forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the
pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding
out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose, with reasonable and
actual costs occasioned thereby and such interest as may have
accrued thereon according to law."1
It is well established, in conformity with this section, that
penalties for the tax delinquency of the bankrupt are not allowed
against his estate if they exceed the legal rate of interest.2 The
instant case presents the question of whether this limitation is
applicable when the penalty accrued during a trustee's operation
of a bankrupt business.
A trustee, in conducting a bankrupt's business for the pur-
pose of liquidating the same, operated the bankrupt's motor
trucks but failed to pay the license fees. Under the state laws the
fees were doubled when payment was not made within the time
allowed by the statute. Held, that the state's lien for the amount
of the penalty was enforceable. Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57, 60
S. Ct. 29, 84 L. Ed. 20 (1939).
Prior to 1934 a trustee or receiver operating the business of
a bankrupt for the purpose of liquidating the estate could not
be assessed under a tax statute that did not, in terms, mention
trustees or receivers as taxable.3 In that year Congress passed
an act4 which provided that trustees and receivers conducting a
bankrupt business should "be subject to all State and local taxes
applicable to such business the same as if such business were
1. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 57(j), 30 Stat. 561 (1899), 11 U.S.C.A. § 93(j)
(1927), as amended by Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575, 52 Stat. 866 (1938).
2. New York v. Jersawit, 263 U.S. 493, 44 S. Ct. 167, 68 L. Ed. 405 (1924);
California v. Moore, 88 F. (2d) 564 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937). But when the amount
of the penalty was within the legal rate chargeable on the delinquent sum
the courts have generally held that the claim was allowable: United States
v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304, 45 S.Ct. 110, 69 L.Ed. 299 (1924); Horn v. Boone County,
44 F. (2d) 920 (C.C.A. 8th, 1930).
3. Reinecke v. Garnder, 277 U.S. 239, 48 S. Ct. 472, 72 L. Ed. 866 (1923);
In re Flatbush Gum Co., Inc., 73 F. (2d) 283 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1934); In re Brown-
ing King & Co., 79 F. (2d) 983 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1935); In re Messenger's Merchants
Lunch Rooms, Inc., 85 F. (2d) 1002 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
4. Act of June 18, 1934, c. 585, 48 Stat. 993, 28 U.S.C.A. § 124(a) (Supp.
1938).
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conducted by an individual or corporation." The court decided
the instant case under the provisions of this act and held that a
state having the power of taxing a business conducted by a trus-
tee on an equal footing with other businesses, must, in order to
realize this equality, be given the power to impose penalties for
delinquencies.
It is submitted that the 1934 act5 was designed only to permit
the assessment of trustees and receivers under general tax sta-
tutes and it does not purport to remove any of the restrictions
imposed by Section 57 (j) relating to the provability of penalties.
Applying the well-settled rule of construction that tax statutes
should not be extended by implication,6 it might well have been
assumed that had Congress intended to allow liens for tax penal-
ties incurred by the trustee to be secured against the estate, it
would have declared such intention in the act. Since the provision
in Section 57 (j) is for the benefit of the creditors and purports to
protect the bankrupt estate from the imposition of penalties and
forfeitures which are punitive in nature, it is difficult to find a
sound practical reason for a distinction between penalties accruing
against the bankrupt and those accruing against the trustee.
H. B.
CORPORATIONS-VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN CORPORATION
AND DIRECTOR OR OFFICER-A corporation purchased an automobile
from plaintiff, payment being secured by a promissory note and
vendor's lien. The car was subsequently sold to the corporation's
president and manager, who in turn sold it to defendant. Plaintiff
sued to enforce the vendor's lien. In holding that the vendor's
lien was extinguished by sale and delivery of the car, the court
stated that an officer or director can contract with the corporation
if the transaction is fair and in good faith. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation v. Hahn, 190 So. 869 (La. App. 1939).
Generally a contract entered into between a corporation and
one of its officers or directors is voidable at the option of the cor-
poration without regard to the fairness of the transaction or the
good faith of the officer or director.1 This rule is subject to the
5. See note 4, supra.
6. In re Flatbush Gum Co., Inc., 73 F. (2d) 283 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1934), cert.
denied, New York v. Arnold, 294 U.S. 713, 55 S.Ct. 509, 79 L.Ed. 1247 (1935).
1. Massoth v. Central Bus Corp., 104 Conn. 683, 134 Atl. 236 (1926); Frank-
ford Exchange Bank v. McCune, 72 S.W. (2d) 155 (Mo. App. 1934); Shaw v.
Crandon State Bank, 145 Wis. 639, 129 N.W. 794 (1911). See Holcomb v. For-
syth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516, 520 (1927).
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